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estate or the trustee personally, if this procedure were followed the spendthrift provision would be irrelevant-" If the beneficiary's interest itself were burdened, it could
be argued that the spendthrift clause is designed merely to prohibit assignments (such
as contingent-fee contracts) by the beneficiary himself, not to prevent a court of equity
2
from fixing proper charges upon his interest.1
There seems to be little difference, however, between an attorney's lien based on a
contingent-fee contract and one based on the reasonable value of his services. Under
the decision in the instant case, a beneficiary, in requesting an attorney to prosecute his
claim, offers the latter the chance to obtain an allowance from the chancellor rather than
a fixed percentage of the amount recovered; the assignment, except in form, would be
made by the beneficiary. Furthermore, the reason for restricting the use of the contingent-fee contract-that the contingent fee may take an exorbitant proportion of the
amount recovered-is refuted by the fact that an attorney, who seeks to enforce a lien
based on a contingent-fee contract with his client, must affirmatively show that it is
fair and equitable.13 Indeed, the plaintiff's failure in the instant case to make such
proof may have been an alternative ground for the decision.'4
Workmen's Compensation Acts-Recovery by Compensated Employee from
Third-Party Tortfeasor-[Illinois].-The plaintiff's deceased, a contractor's employee,
was killed through the negligence of the defendant, a truckdriver for a large printing
concern. Both employers were "bound" by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
1"Since a payment from the trust estate for services rendered to protect the interest of one
beneficiary is in effect a gift to that beneficiary in addition to the amounts grantedin the trust
instrument, it is possible that other beneficiaries of the trust could object to such a depletion
of their interests. See 2 Scott, Trusts § 254 (1939). It may be argued, however, that the trustee should be charged personally for expenses incurred by the beneficiary in asserting his interest where the trustee erroneously refused to pay him sums due under the trust. But the trustee's mistake of law-claiming a set-off of debts owed the estate by the beneficiary despite the
spendthrift clause-is probably insufficient to be the basis of personal liability without a right
of reimbursement against the estate. See 2 Scott, Trusts § 201 (1939).
12Notes 9and io supra. In the instant case, the trustee possessed sufficient funds belonging
to the beneficiary to pay the attorney. But if the trustee, after being served with notice of a
valid attorney's lien, had paid the beneficiary his total interestignoring the attorney's lien, and
the beneficiary had failed to pay the attorney, the trustee probably would have been personally
liable to the attorney for the amount of the lien. Cf. Sutton v. Chicago R. Co., 258 Ill. 551,
ioi N.E. 940 (1913); Zazove v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co., 28 Ill. App.
534 (i92o). And he could not have secured reimbursement from the trust estate. 2 Scott,
Trusts § 245 (I939).
'3 Goranson v. Solomonson, 3o4 Ill. App. 8o, 25 N.E. (2d) 930 (i94o); cf. Masterson v.
Wall, 365 Ill.
io2, 6 N.E. (2d) i6i (1936); Berkos v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 Ill. App. 243
(1935).
'4 It had been argued in the lower court that the contract provided that the attorney was
to receive one-third of all subsequent payments to the beneficiary from the corpus of the
trust. The lower court construed it to mean that the attorney should receive one-third of the
debt the beneficiary owed the trust estate. Opinion of the trial court as reported in Brief for
Appellee, McKeown v. Pridmore, at 39, 40-4 i . The appellate court said that the attorney
failed to show that the contract was fair and equitable. McKeown v. Pridmore, 310Ill. App.

634, 647-48, 3s N.E. (2d) 376, 382 (I941).
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Act. An award of $6,ooo against the contractor was granted under the act to the plaintiff, and the contractor then brought suit against the printer, under Section 29' of the
act, for recovery of the amount of the award, which suit was still pending at the time
of the disposition of the instant case. The plaintiff then brought an action for wrongful
death damages of $io,ooo against the defendant. The defendant sought to establish
that he was bound by the workmen's compensation act and that consequently he
was not subject to a suit by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's right of action having been
transferred to the contractor. For the purpose of appeal the parties entered into an
agreed stipulation of facts, which stated that both employers were bound by the act
and that the plaintiff's deceased and the defendant were acting in the course of-their
employment at the time of the accident. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff,
held, that in the absence of a statement in the stipulation or evidence that the defendant is bound by the act, the court must assume that the defendant is not so bound
and is, therefore, subject to a statutory wrongful death action. Furthermore, the words
"bound by this Act" in Section 29 mean "subject to its terms" and are to be applied
only to employers. Judgment affirmed, one judge dissenting. Thornton v. Herman.2
Until quite recently, the only cases which concerned Section 29 of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act have been suits by injured parties against the employers of
negligent third parties. The decisions in these cases have followed the statute.3 In
,935, in Bottkof v. Fenske,4 the plaintiff brought a common law action of negligence
against a co-employee. The court which decided the instant case rejected the defendx Section 29 provides that "where an injury or death for which compensation is payable by
the employer under this Act was not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or
his employees," and was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages in
some third party, and such third party has elected to be bound by the act, or is bound automatically, then the right of the injured employee will be transferred to his employer, who may
recover the amount of the compensation award from the third party. Where, under similar
circumstances, the third party is not bound by the act, then the injured employee retains his
common law right of action against him, subject only to a claim on the judgment by the injured party's employer for the amount of the compensation award. Il. Rev. Stat. (1941)
c. 48, § x66.
2311 Ill. App. 513, 36 N.E. (2d) 840 (I94I). The principal case is of interest because an
appeal is now pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, which will be confronted for the
first time with these issues. The supreme court may possibly reverse the appellate court on the
ground that the latter court's holding as to the stipulation of facts runs directly counter to the
supreme court's decision in Stevens v. Illinois Central R. Co., 306 Il.370, 137 N.E. 859 (1923).
This case held that once it has been established, as was done in the principal case, that the
defendant was employed by an employer bound by the act, the burden is upon the plaintiff
to show that the defendant was not so bound. The court's holding on this issue in the principal case is consistent with O'Brien v. Chicago City R. Co., 3o5 Ill.
244, 137 N.E. 214 (1922),
holding that a plaintiff's right of action against a third-party tortfeasor employer was not
founded on the workmen's compensation act but on the common law, and that, if the defendants had any defense under the act, it was incumbent upon them to plead it. This decision
seems to have been overruled, however, by the Stevens case.
3Friebel v. Chicago City R. Co., 28o Ill. 76, 117 N.E. 467 (1917); Keeran v. Peoria,
Bloomington &Champaign Traction Co., 277 Ill.
413, 115 N.E. 636 (1917); O'Brien v. Chicago
City R. Co., 305 Il. 244, 137 N.E. 2r4 (1922); cf. Gones v. Fisher, 286 Ill.
6o6, 122 N.E. 95
(i919). See note isupra.
4 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935).
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ant's contention that Section 29 was ground for a demurrer to the complaint and held
that an employee-tortfeasorcould not use Section 29 for such a purpose, because "bound
by this Act" meant "subject to its terms" and that Section 29 could be so used only by
employers. Later, in the case of Hoffv. Lindstrom,s the plaintiff, injured in an accident
caused by the negligence of a taxi driver, sued at common law and recovered judgments in the trial court against both the driver and the taxi company. On appeal, the
appellate court adhered to its interpretation of the statute in the Boithof case and reversed the judgment as to the company and affirmed it as to the driver. One observer
predicted that, as a result of the Hoff and Botthof decisions, similar cases would frequently arise inasmuch as most automobile drivers are covered by liability insurance,
thus assuring plaintiffs a larger recovery than would be permitted under the workmen's
6
compensation act.
The principal criticism of these cases rests upon a literal interpretation of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act. Thus, restriction of the words "person .... bound by
this Act" in Section 29 to mean "employer .... bound by this Act" does not seem
proper, especially since the act elsewhere speaks of employees as being "bound."7
Viewed in the light of the common law background of the Illinois statute, however,
this criticism loses much of its effect. These acts probably were drafted with the idea
that, in actions under them, employees would always be plaintiffs and employers would
always be defendants and that they would be bound in these respective capacities.8
That this assumption was grounded upon the experience of the time and that it applies
to third-party liability as well would appear to be verified by the fact that, until seventeen years after enactment of the original statute, no third-party actions against employees were ever reported.9 It can therefore be argued that third-party tortfeasor employees should not be permitted to escape full liability under a statutory provision intended to limit the liability of employers only.
The Botthof case is open to further criticism on the ground that it allowed a common
law recovery against a fellow servant, which the act would seem to prohibit. Section
610 deprives employees of common law and statutory remedies other than compensation for injuries incurred while acting in the course of employment. Furthermore, a
common law action against third-party tortfeasors under Section 29 is subject to the
S 284 IlM. App. 651, 3 N.E. (2d) i49 (1936). This is a memorandum opinion. The facts and
holding of the case were derived from portions of the unreported opinion quoted in the principal case, Thornton v. Herman, 311 Ill. App. 313,321, 36 N.E. (2d) 840, 845 (194i), and from
Brief of Appellee, Thornton v. Herman, at 14.
6Angerstein, Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,

19

Chicago-Kent L. Rev.

231, 255 (1941).

7Ill. Rev. Stat. (1941) c. 48, § 138(c).
8
Thus the section of the statute which sets forth the circumstances in'which an employee
shall be bound also discusses the'measure of the liability of employers. Ibid.
9 Cunningham v. Metzger, 258 Ill. App. i5o (1930), cert. den. 258 Ill. App. xiii (193o);
Bentley v. Lippert, 277 Ill. App. 6i 5 (1934), cert. den. 277 Ill. App. xiii (1934). In each of
these cases the plaintiff was suing a fellow servant for injuries which arose from the servant's
negligent handling of an automobile. Both cases denied recovery under §§ 6 and 29. It should
be noted, however, that in these cases the words "bound by this Act" in § 29 were assumed

to include employees, thisissue not having been raised.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (194)

c. 48, § 143.
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condition precedent that "an injury or death for which compensation is payable by the
employer under this Act" be "not proximately caused by the negligence of the employer or his employees."" But it is also probable that the abolition of remedies in Section 6
was intended to apply only to remedies against employers.- Thus, in suits between
fellow employees, the common law would apply, and there would be no point in requiring injured employees to fulfill the conditions precedent of Section 29 before bringing a
common law action against an employee tortfeasor.13
Another criticism of the Hoff and Botthof cases might be that they make for a difference between the amount of the primary liability of the servant and the secondary liability of the master, and that they make the employers a privileged class which alone
may enjoy limited liability, even for torts personally committed in the course of business against employees of other employers. This discrimination in Section 29 between
employers and employees may be explained as the result of the legislature's attempt to
hold out an inducement to employers to elect to be bound by the act. 4 Since the election feature has been almost entirely abolished by the 1917 act,xs this inducement is
now ineffectual. Legislative redrafting of Section 29 to abolish the common law liability both of employers bound by the act and of their employees, or perhaps the entire
deletion of that section, would be more consonant with modem notions of liability
under workmen's compensation acts. 6
xxItalics added.
"2There are several dicta to this effect. See O'Brien v. Chicago City R. Co., 305 Ill.
244,
25X, 137 N.E. 214, 218 (1922); Huntoon v. Pritchard, 37,111.36,43, 2o N.E. (2d) 53, 56 (939).
But see Keeran v. Peoria, Bloomington & Champaign Traction Co., 277 Ill.
413, 419, 1isN.E.

636, 638 (IM91).
1s The words "or his employees" in § 29 could be said to have been inserted in order to
preserve for the tortfeasor outside of the employment relationship the defense of contributory
negligence.
'4 In the original Illinois act a number of "extra-hazardous" industries were named, and
employers in those industries were allowed to "elect" whether they would be bound or not, and
employees in these industries were also given the option of being bound. The defenses of employers who elected not to be bound were taken away except as against employees who so
elected. Ill. L. (19,3) 337, at §§ 1-3. Angerstein, op. cit. supra note 6, at 241 et. seq., suggests that this limitation was offered to employers as an "inducement" to become bound by the
act. He goes on to argue, however, in criticism of the Hoff and Botthof cases, that since, under
the original act, employees also could elect to become bound, they too should be allowed the
advantages of limited liability under § 29.

xsIll. Rev. Stat. (1941) c. 48, § 139.
x6 The entire deletion of § 29 would eliminate the discrimination in favor of third-party
employers. The theory behind such a deletion would be to restrict the limited liability to the
employer's own enterprise and those engaged in it. Where the employer's enterprise negligently
injured people outside it, these people would have their recourse at common law, regardless of
the employer's standing under the statute. Were this section deleted, the legislature might
have to write a new section to cover the rights of an employer who has paid compensation to
an employee who had received a common law judgment against a third party. This situation
has been provided for in some states by statute and in others by judicial decision. See Right of
Compensated Employee to Sue Third Party Tortfeasor, 40 Yale L. J. iio8 (1931); Rights of
Employer and Employee under Workmen's Compensation Acts When Injury is Caused by
a Third Party, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 971 (1925).

